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The Ethics of Freedom:
On the Moral Foundations of Economic Analysis
NuNo o. MartiNs *
AbstrAct: Amartya Sen criticises the utilitarian philosophy that underpins neoclas-
sical economics, and suggests the development of an economic theory grounded 
on a broad conception of freedom. According to the article, freedom includes for 
Sen two dimensions, namely the opportunity aspect and the process aspect. The 
opportunity aspect of freedom consists in the capability to achieve the goals that 
freedom provides us with, and, thus, can be seen in a consequentialist fashion. 
The procedural dimension of freedom, on the other hand, highlights the role of 
rights and procedures, and is in line with deontological approaches to ethics. But 
since deontological (or procedural) and consequentialist approaches to ethics are 
often said to be incompatible, the article raises the question of whether Sen’s con-
ception is coherent or not. The author of the article argues that consequentialist 
and deontological approaches need not be incompatible, whereby he underlines in 
a special way the role of uncertainty as a key element in the understanding of the 
relationship between those two views of ethics. Finally, the article also assesses 
the coherence of A. Sen’s conception of the economic agent, a conception that 
resorts both to the notion of “moral sentiments” developed by Adam Smith as well 
as to the notion of “moral imperatives” developed by Kant.
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resumo: A filosofia utilitarista subjacente à escola neoclássica de economia tem 
sido amplamente criticada por Amartya Sen, facto esse que, segundo o autor do 
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presente artigo, nos pode sugerir o desenvolvimento de uma teoria económica 
baseada numa concepção ampla de liberdade. Para Sen, com efeito, o conceito 
de liberdade comporta duas dimensões bem explícitas, uma relacionada com 
as oportunidades proporcionadas pela liberdade, e a outra relacionada com os 
aspectos processuais da mesma. No que se refere à primeira dimensão, o artigo 
sublinha sobretudo o facto de a liberdade proporcionar a possibilidade de realizar 
determinados objectivos, numa perspectiva consequencialista. Por outro lado, 
a dimensão processual da liberdade evidencia a importância dos direitos e 
dos procedimentos, pelo que o artigo mostra igualmente até que ponto Sen se 
encontra também em linha com as éticas de cariz deontológico. Dado, porém, 
que as abordagens consequencialista e deontológica tendem a ser consideradas 
incompatíveis, o artigo não pode deixar de levantar a questão relativa à coerência 
da concepção ética do próprio Amartya Sen. No final de contas, a intenção do 
artigo é precisamente demonstrar que estas duas abordagens (consequencialista 
e deontológica) não são necessariamente incompatíveis entre si, pelo que o autor 
procura no conceito de incerteza o elemento necessário a uma correcta com- 
preensão da relação que existe, nomeadamente no campo da economia, entre 
esses dois tipos de abordagem ética. Finalmente, no sentido de evidenciar a 
coerência da concepção de agente económico defendida por Sen, o artigo recorre 
também, entre outros, seja ao conceito “sentimento moral” desenvolvido por 
Adam Smith, seja à noção Kantiana de “imperativo moral”.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: Acção� A�ente, Relatividade do� Análise económica� �a�acidades� 
�onse�uencialismo� Economia do Bem�estar� Emoções� Ética da virtude� Ética 
deontoló�ica� Ética, Visão conse�uencialista da� Im�erativo cate�órico� Incer�
teza ética� Intenção moral� Kant, Immanuel (1724�1804)� Li�erdade (Econo�
mia)� Li�ertarianismo� Máximas� Microeconomia� Nozick, Ro�ert (1938�2002)� 
O�ortunidade� Princí�ios morais� Pro�a�ilidade, Ética da� Pro�a�iliorismo� 
Pro�a�ilismo� Procedimentos éticos� Sen, Amartya Kumar (1933�)� Senti� 
mentos� Utilidade� Utilitarianismo.
1. Introduction
Amartya Sen argues that “economics has had two rather different 
origins, but related in rather different ways, concerned respectively with 
‘ethics’ on the one hand, and what may be called ‘engineering’ on the 
other.”1 The author suggests that a closer contact with the “ethics-related 
tradition” which “goes back at least to Aristotle” can enrich economic 
theorising.2 When addressing the relation between ethics and economics, 
Sen refers to two main areas of contact: the “ethics-related view of moti-
vation”, and the “ethics-related view of social achievement”. The “ethics- 
 1 seN, Amartya K. – On Ethics and Economics. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: B. Blackwell, 
1987, pp. 2-3.
 2 Ibidem, p. 3.
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related view of motivation” is concerned with human agency and behav-
iour, while the “ethics-related view of social achievement” addresses social 
welfare, or in Aristotle’s terms, ‘the good of man’ (as discussed in Aristo-
tle’s Politics or in the Nicomachean Ethics).
Sen refers to the “ethics-related view of motivation” as the “Socratic” 
question of “how should one live”3, while referring to the “ethics-related 
view of social achievement” as the “Aristotelian” question.4 Much of Sen’s 
contribution has been concerned with developing these ethical issues, 
while connecting them to the study of microeconomics and behaviour on 
the one hand, and to the study of welfare economics on the other hand.
Sen’s writings on rational behaviour, choice and agency5 have a strong 
influence of the “ethics-related view of motivation” (the “Socratic” ques-
tion). In these writings, Sen draws upon the moral philosophy of authors 
such as Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant explaining how many moral 
motivations that are discussed by these authors cannot be accommodated 
by neoclassical microeconomic theorising. Sen’s work on welfare econom-
ics and his “capability approach”, on the other hand, has been much in 
line with the “ethics-related view of social achievement” (the “Aristotelian” 
question), and with the assessment of human advantage and well-being.6
Nevertheless, both fields of economic analysis Sen addresses (namely, 
microeconomics and behaviour on the one hand, and welfare economics 
on the other hand) are pervaded by utilitarian philosophy, which under-
pins the neoclassical economic perspective that dominates contemporary 
economic analysis. The explanation of individual behaviour undertaken 
in (neoclassical) microeconomics makes extensive use of the notion of a 
utility function, while presupposing that agents are permanently trying to 
optimise their utility level.7 The analysis of human well-being undertaken 
in (neoclassical) welfare economics also resorts to the notion of a utility 
function, which aggregates individual utilities.
Sen has criticised the neoclassical conception of the human agent, in 
which the latter is regarded as a utility optimiser, arguing that many moti-
 3 Idem, p. 10.
 4 Idem, pp. 9-10.
 5 Cf. seN, Amartya K. – Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press, 
1982; id. – On Ethics and Economics, cit.; id. – “Maximization and the Act of Choice”. In: Econo-
metrica. 65 (1997), pp. 745-779; id. – Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.
 6 seN, Amartya K. – Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985; id. – Development As Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
 7 On this topic, see the discussion between Frank Hahn and Amartya Sen in Meeks, J. Gay 
(ed.) – Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays on Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
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vations for behaviour (including ethical motivations) cannot be accom-
modated in the behavioural assumptions of neoclassical economics. He 
has also criticised the use of utility functions as an indicator of well-being, 
noting that utilitarianism relies on a subjectivist mental metric. In the 
present paper I shall not discuss in detail Sen’s critique of mainstream 
and neoclassical economics,8 but rather scrutinise the consistency of 
the ethical conception Sen suggests as an alternative to the utilitarian 
<perspective which underpins neoclassical economics.
Sen has attempted to bring a broader philosophical basis to economic 
analysis, both in what the economic conception of the human agent is con-
cerned, and regarding the analysis of social welfare too. To do so, he has 
called for a conception of freedom that includes elements from consequen-
tialist approaches, and from deontological approaches to ethics, while also 
drawing upon the writings of Aristotle and Adam Smith. His argument is that 
freedom is valuable for two different reasons.
On the one hand, freedom gives us more opportunity to achieve what we 
value. But, Sen argues, the process through which we achieve something is 
also important for assessing freedom. Sen’s conception of freedom attempts to 
reconcile two different perspectives, namely consequentialist approaches, and 
procedural (or deontological) approaches, by combining a consequentialist 
emphasis on the broadening of opportunities with the emphasis on rights that 
characterises the procedural or deontological approach.
However, these perspectives (viz., the consequentialist and the deon-
tological approaches to ethics) are often taken to be irreconcilable. It is 
often argued that actions may be judged according to their consequences, 
or in terms of their conformity to a given set of moral principles which 
must be followed regardless of their consequences, but not both. Although 
these perspectives are typically taken to be incompatible, Sen suggests 
that both are essential for a proper conception of freedom. In this paper 
the relationship between these two perspectives will be analysed, in order 
to assess whether Sen’s conception of freedom contains inconsistencies 
due to the acceptance of both perspectives in its formulation.
Another topic to be discussed is Sen’s conception of the economic agent. 
To develop a conception of the human agent, Sen brings elements not only 
from Kantian moral philosophy (namely Kant’s categorical imperative), 
but also from Aristotle and Adam Smith. This again raises the question 
of the consistency of Sen’s work, which brings together elements from 
competing ethical approaches. While Kant is regarded as a fundamental 
author for deontological approaches to ethics, Aristotle’s writings con-
 8 For a discussion of this topic, see MartiNs, Nuno O. – “Capabilities As Causal Powers”. 
In: Cambridge Journal of Economics. 30 (2006), pp. 671-685.
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stitute an example of a different ethical tradition, namely ‘virtue ethics’, 
and Adam Smith’s moral philosophy is closer to the descriptive style of 
Aristotle’s ethical writings than to the Kantian approach. This means that 
in addition to the relationship between consequentialist and deontologial 
approaches, one must also address the relationship between deonto- 
logical (Kantian) ethics and ‘virtue ethics’ in order to assess the consist-
ency of Sen’s project. This issue will be discussed in the last section of the 
paper, after which some concluding comments will follow.
2. Freedom: Opportunity and Process
Amartya Sen advocates that there are two different motives why 
freedom is valuable:
Freedom is valuable for at least two different reasons. First, more freedom gives us 
more opportunity to achieve those things that we value, and have reason to value. This 
aspect of freedom is concerned primarily with our ability to achieve, rather than with the 
process through which that achievement comes about. Second, the process through 
which things happen may be also of importance in assessing freedom. For example, 
it may be thought, reasonably enough, that the procedure of free decision by the 
person himself (no matter how successful the person is in getting what he would like 
to achieve) is an important requirement for freedom. There is, thus, an important 
distinction between the “opportunity aspect” and the “process aspect” of freedom.”9
An ethical approach that emphasises the broadening of human opportu-
nities is primarily concerned with consequences, and not so much with the 
process through which consequences like the broadening of opportunities are 
achieved. But, Sen argues, both opportunities and processes are essential to a 
proper understanding of freedom.
Consequentialism is the view that normative prescriptions depend entirely 
on the consequences of our actions. Procedural (or deontological) approaches, 
on the other hand, are those in which the morality of an action depends 
entirely on whether the procedures we follow are in accordance with a given 
set of moral principles, regardless of their consequences. Sen’s conception of 
freedom attempts to reconcile consequentialist and procedural (or deonto-
logical) approaches.
These approaches, however, are often taken to constitute a dichotomy. 
Indeed, this is the dichotomy between “‘goodness’ of outcomes” and “‘right-
ness’ of procedures”.10 Procedural or deontological approaches to ethics deny 
the existence of moral value in consequences because, in these approaches, 
morality comes only from the procedural dimension of our action. Note that 
the role of processes may be seen under two different perspectives. On the 
 9 seN, Amartya K. – Rationality and Freedom, cit., p. 585.
10 Ibidem, p. 278.
NuNo o. MartiNs354
354
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
65 • 2009
one hand there is the process through which moral principles are derived (or 
justified). On the other hand, there are the ongoing procedures we undertake 
in our daily affairs.
Deontological approaches typically derive moral principles through 
the moral reasoning of an idealised mind. The classical example is Kant’s 
derivation of the “categorical imperative”, which leads to a moral law that 
must be followed regardless of its consequences.11 Another example is 
John Rawls’ theory of justice, which also undertakes a derivation of moral 
principles, resorting to notions like “reflexive equilibrium”, “original posi-
tion” and “veil of ignorance”.12
Moral principles, derived under such an impartial view, are then seen as 
universal moral laws, which must be followed by every individual. Deonto-
logical approaches to ethics place all the moral value in the “rightness of pro-
cedures”. For example, once the Kantian categorical imperative is derived 
(or once Robert Nozick’s libertarian rights are specified13), the moral value of 
the resulting principles is not affected by the states of affairs that may occur 
in virtue of following such principles.
This happens because, in deontological approaches, moral value does not 
exist as an ontological property of things or state of affairs (such as conse-
quences), but as a property of actions, and results from the accordance of the 
latter with deontological moral laws. Supporters of deontological approaches 
to ethics claim that it is not possible to derive moral statements from onto-
logical properties (that is, to derive ought from is), a claim that is closely 
connected to what is usually termed as the “naturalistic fallacy”.14
Regardless of how much our common sense may be inclined to take into 
account consequences (especially when purely procedural rights lead to 
catastrophic consequences), it is true that from a logical point of view, once 
morality is confined to the “rightness of procedures”, there seems to be no 
reason why one should take consequences into consideration in moral evalu-
ation. Once it is assumed that morality lies at a procedural, or deontological, 
level, the only relevant moral question is whether procedures are in accord-
ance with such moral principles.
In a consequentialist approach, on the other hand, the initial premise is 
that morality exists in consequences (as some sort of ontological property). 
11 kaNt, Immanuel (1724-1804) – Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the 
Theory of Ethics. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. 4th ed. London: Kongmans, Green and 
Co., 1889.
12 rawls, John – A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1971.
13 Nozick, Robert – Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974.
14 On the so called “naturalistic fallacy”, see Moore, G. E. – Principia Ethica. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1903.
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Thus, actions are judged in terms of the (goodness of the) consequences they 
generate. From this premise, the moral legitimacy of the procedures depends 
on whether the latter lead to consequences that are morally valued (and thus 
ought is derived from is, that is, morality is grounded on ontology).
Of course, consequentialism requires that we have some idea of which con-
sequences are more desirable, in order to assess and compare consequences. 
Examples of conceptions which can be used to assess consequences are utili-
tarian conceptions, where consequences are assessed in terms of their utility 
(where the latter can be interpreted as meaning happiness, for example), or an 
Aristotelian conception of the Human Good and human functioning. Whilst a 
strong critic of utilitarianism, Sen has no doubt been much sympathetic to an 
Aristotelian account of human functioning.15
In short, the conflict between consequentialist and deontological approaches 
to ethics springs from a divergence in a starting premise or ‘prior principle’, 
which relates moral value either to consequences or procedures, respectively. 
However, Sen argues that such method of assessing moral value, by deriving 
morality from a ‘prior principle’, is not the only method available for moral 
evaluation:
When it is claimed that a certain moral principle has shortcomings, what can be the 
basis of such an allegation? There seem to be at least two different ways of grounding 
such a criticism, aside from just checking its direct appeal to moral intuition. One is to 
check the implications of the principle by taking up particular cases in which the results 
of employing that principle can be seen in a rather stark way, and then to examine these 
implications against our intuition. I shall call such a critique a case-implication critique. 
The other is to move not from the general to the particular, but from the general to the 
more general. One can examine the consistency of the principle with another principle 
that is acknowledged to be more fundamental. Such prior principles are usually formu-
lated at a rather abstract level, and frequently take the form of congruence with some 
very general procedures. […] I shall call a critique based on such an approach a prior-
principle critique.16
It is through ‘case-implication critiques’ that Sen reaches an approach to 
ethics where both procedures and consequences are valued. In an example, 
Sen shows how not breaking a given moral constraint could lead to a con-
sequence that goes against an even more important moral principle.17 Sen’s 
15 On the relationship between an Aristotelian conception of human functioning and the 
capability approach endorsed by A. Sen, see NussbauM, Martha C. – “Human Functioning and 
Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism”. In: Political Theory. 20 (1992), pp. 202-246; 
id. – Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000. For a discussion on the relationship between Nussbaum’s and Sen’s conception, 
see MartiNs, Nuno O. – “Realism, Universalism and Capabilities”. In: Review of Social Economy. 
65 (2007), pp. 253-278.
16 seN, Amartya K. – Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell; 
Mit Press, 1982, pp. 353-354 (emphasis in original).
17 seN, Amartya K. – “Rights and Agency”. In: Philosophy and Public Affairs. 11 (1982), pp. 3-39.
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example is a case where a given person a knows that a group of people b 
intend to attack a person c. To prevent this, person a needs to find person c. 
But to do so, person a must break into the office of person d without permis-
sion, where person c left a message with his location. In this example, only 
by violating the liberty of person d (by getting into person’s d office without 
permission) an even more important right (the physical integrity of person c) 
can be kept from being violated.
From this case-implication critique, Sen concludes that deontological 
approaches should take into account the moral value of both procedures and 
consequences. Sen’s example raises the question of which action is to be said 
moral when all possible actions have consequences that violate “rightness of 
procedures”. Such a situation requires some trade-off between the competing 
rights at stake, hence a relative valuation of rights vis-à-vis each other.
However, whilst Sen gives many particular examples where (our moral 
intuition suggests that) both procedures and consequences should be taken 
into account, he does not explain why procedural and consequentialist 
approaches can be compatible. But the latter issue is essential for the logical 
consistency of Sen’s ethical approach. This issue shall be addressed in the 
following sections.
3. Agent Relativity and Uncertainty
Many of the arguments made against consequentialist approaches to ethics 
(including those of Bernard Williams,18 Thomas Nagel19 and Derek Parfit,20 
among others) stress the need of assessing actions in an “agent relative” way. 
As Sen notes:
The need for agent relativity has been seen as an argument against consequen-
tialist ethics for its alleged failure to deal with important agent-relative values. For 
example, in a much discussed example, a substantial distinction is made between 
(1) murdering someone oneself, and (2) failing to prevent a murder committed by 
a third person. The former has been seen, not implausibly, in even more negative 
terms than the latter.21
Although the two actions (1) and (2) lead to the same consequences, the 
ethical case against case (1) is much stronger than that against case (2). 
18 williaMs, Bernard – “A critique of utilitarianism”. In: sMart, J. J. C.; williaMs, Bernard 
(ed.) – Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973; williaMs, 
Bernard – “Utilitarianism and integrity”. In: Glover, Jonathan (ed.) – Utilitarianism and Its 
Critics. New York; London: Macmillan Pub. Co.; Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1990.
19 NaGel, Thomas – “Limits of objectivity”. In: McMurriN (ed.) – Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values. Vol. 1. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980.
20 Parfit, Derek – Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
21 seN, Amartya K. – Rationality and Freedom, cit., p. 481.
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Consequentialism is accused of failing to take this difference into account. 
Nevertheless, Sen notes that a consequentialist sees both consequences, in 
case (1) and (2), as equal only if a position-neutral view of consequences 
is adopted. For example, a murderer might value the consequence of her 
or his act much more negatively than the death of a person caused by 
another person. There is no reason why the valuation of consequences 
should not be position-dependent, thus taking agent relativity into con-
sideration.
The distinction made by Sen between murdering someone oneself, and 
failing to prevent a murder committed by a third person, is also a central issue 
in a famous example discussed by Immanuel Kant, in a reply to Benjamin 
Constant. Kant’s categorical imperative requires that any maxim of the will 
we are following must be accepted by us as a universal law. In the case of a 
perfect duty, to universalise the maxim of the will (i.e., to accept it as a univer-
sal law) must not lead to a logical contradiction, while the case of an imper-
fect duty is when we believe it is reasonable to wish that our maxim of the will 
becomes an universal law (this second type of duty is imperfect because it still 
depends on our subjective preferences, whereas perfect duty does not depend 
on subjective preferences, but rather on logical consistency alone).
Kant’s categorical imperative entails that in any situation an agent must 
tell the truth, since if lying would become a universal law the very possibility 
of communication (which is presupposed in the very act of communication 
we are performing when speaking) is undermined, and thus a logical contra-
diction follows. But Constant notes that if a murderer asks us where her or 
his victim is, the Kantian categorical imperative would command us to tell 
the truth, thus leading to the death of the victim.
However, Kant argues that if we tell the truth to a murderer who asks 
where her or his victim is, our action is morally valid, because we are respon-
sible only for following the moral principle of telling the truth, and not for the 
consequences that might occur due to the (truthful) information provided. 
If we lie to the murderer, on the other hand, not only would we be going 
against the moral principle of telling the truth, as we would also become 
responsible for all the consequences that might occur in virtue of such false 
information (like if when telling to the murderer that the victim is in a given 
place we believe she or he is not, it turned out to be that the victim actually 
was in such a place).
Kant’s argument is, of course, based on the premise that moral laws are 
independent from consequences. Thus, a given action should be done (or a 
given rule should be followed) because of the “rightness of the procedure”, and 
not because it brings better consequences. If this was not the case, one could 
tell the truth to the murderer under the justification that in this particular 
case keeping the ‘telling the truth’ rule does not bring better consequences.
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The persuasiveness of Kant’s discussion of this example springs from two 
distinct aspects at play. Firstly, there is the issue of moral responsibility and 
agent relativity. If we believe that each person is responsible for her or his 
own actions, telling the truth is our own responsibility, while the death of the 
victim is someone else’s responsibility. Secondly, there is uncertainty. We are 
always uncertain of whether the murderer will actually kill the victim, for 
there is always some degree of uncertainty about what another person will 
actually do, or whether such a person will actually be successful.
Effectively, Kant reminds us that lying may actually be the option that 
leads to the death of the person, because our belief concerning where the 
person is may be wrong. Kant then notes that if we lie to the murderer we 
would become responsible for all the consequences that might occur in virtue 
of such false information, like if when telling to the murderer that the victim 
is in a given place we believe she or he is not, it turned out to be that the victim 
actually was in such a place. Kant is emphasising the existence of uncertainty 
about the actual consequence that will follow.
Thus, we tend to think of the situation as a choice between surely failing 
to tell the truth, or a possibility of a death, and not as a comparison between 
not telling the truth, and the death of a person. If we are not sure that the 
most terrible consequence (the death of the victim) will really occur once we 
choose to follow the categorical imperative and tell the truth, there seems to 
be a less strong motive for choosing the option of not telling the truth.
Now, in what follows I will provide a modified version of the example Kant 
discusses, in order to engage in a ‘case-implication critique’ of Kant’s perspec-
tive. Imagine now a situation similar to the one discussed by Kant, but where 
the murder does not depend on someone else’s responsibility, and where there 
is no degree of uncertainty regarding consequences. For example, imagine 
that the murderer who makes the threat is a pre-programmed computer, 
where the people who programmed this computer did not have the intention 
that it would kill anyone, and that there is no uncertainty concerning whether 
this computer will succeed in killing the victim. In this case, if we knew that 
the victim would die for sure unless we lie, can we really say that the option of 
telling the truth is morally valid? And are consequences as irrelevant as in the 
previous version of the example, even from a Kantian perspective?
In this modified version of the example, the responsibility of the death 
of the victim cannot be attributed to anyone else, and we are faced with two 
options, where both have certain consequences, us telling a lie, or the death 
of a person, respectively. In this case, consequences are already contained in 
our action, for there is a necessary connection between consequences and 
procedures. And since there is no other person involved in the process, any 
responsibility for an outcome cannot be applied to anyone else but us.
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In this modified version of the example discussed by Kant, an ontological 
property of reality – namely, the existence of a necessary relation between 
procedures and consequences – implies that consequences are ontologically 
contained in procedures. Thus, to attach moral value to procedures would be 
inescapably accompanied by the recognition of the moral value of the conse-
quences since consequences are necessarily connected to procedures. Note 
that this does not mean that we are deriving morality from ontology, in the 
sense of attaching moral value to ontological entities, but rather that even if 
morality exists in procedures only (as in a deontological approach), we are 
however unable to detach morality from consequences, for consequences and 
procedures are ontologically inseparable in a system of necessary connections.
When we posit that morality is in procedures only, any reference to 
consequences would be morally irrelevant. However, if consequences are 
already contained in, or necessarily connected to, procedures (and become 
inseparable from these, without any degree of uncertainty), then morality 
of procedures becomes inseparable from consequences. In this case, even if 
we do not accept to derive ought from is (that is, the morality of procedures 
from a putative morality of consequences), the converse derivation of is from 
ought would be logically implied, for consequences are inseparable from, and 
contained in, procedures.
Now, if we do not tend to follow Kant in rejecting consequentialism so 
firmly in this modified version of the example discussed by Kant as in its 
original version, it seems thus that it is the absence of a necessary connection 
between procedures and consequences that makes Kant’s argument particu-
larly persuasive. That is, it is uncertainty (together with agent relativity) that 
makes Kant’s position persuasive.
Of course, the relation of logical necessity between consequences and pro-
cedures, presupposed in the modified version of the example presented above, 
does not occur in real life – there is always some degree of uncertainty on 
whether given consequences necessarily follow from given procedures, and 
thus the idea of ‘certain consequences’ is just a degenerate limit-concept.
The main point, however, is that what makes consequences so radically 
separated from procedures for ethical analysis purposes is not their essen-
tial feature of being future events per se, but rather a predicate associated to 
all future events, namely uncertainty. The fact that consequences are future 
events caused by previous procedures, per se, would not make them any less 
important in procedural analysis if they were necessarily implied (and in this 
sense already contained) in procedures. It is the fact that uncertainty is always 
present in consequences (as a predicate of all future events) that renders con-
sequences less important for us in the original formulation of the example. 
Moreover, the interplay with other human agents leads to a co-responsibility 
situation, where the fact that other agents (for example, the murderer who 
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sets the whole situation) might be morally responsible in a much higher 
degree than us, may distract us from the fact that there is also some moral 
responsibility involved in our own action.
But if we were completely certain that without us telling a lie the victim 
would be killed (and with no other agent involved for us to share responsibil-
ity with), our choice would be between two possible outcomes: a failure to tell 
the truth or a person’s death. Knowing for certain that the victim would be 
killed if we tell the truth, then “rightness of procedures” cannot be separated 
from the consequences of our actions. And if consequences become neces-
sarily connected to procedures (as a certain outcome) in this way, it becomes 
difficult to differentiate whether one is responsible for consequences as well. 
The fact that uncertainty (and in some cases co-responsibility too) is always 
presupposed in future outcomes should not deviate our mind from the fact 
that it is uncertainty (and in some cases co-responsibility too) that makes our 
intuitive assessments tend to prefer deontological approaches in many situa-
tions, while rejecting consequentialist analysis.
Kant himself refers to the existence of uncertainty in order to make his 
argument more persuasive, when noting how if we lie to the murderer we 
would become responsible for all the consequences that might be caused by 
such false information, such as if when telling to the murderer that the victim 
is a given place we believe she or he is not, it turned out to be that the victim 
actually was in such a place. The uncertainty concerning the possibility of this 
outcome is emphasised by Kant when arguing that we must follow the moral 
law of telling the truth, and plays an important role in making Kant’s example 
convincing. Only under uncertainty about outcomes would Kant’s example 
remain persuasive.
In the next section I will argue that once we clarify that it is uncertainty 
(and in some cases co-responsibility too) that drives a wedge between proce-
dures and consequences, the gap between deontological and consequentialist 
approaches does not seem so strong anymore, even when the starting premise 
is that morality is attached to procedures.
4. Beyond Consequentialism and Deontology
The reader may ask at this stage why was so much space spent above 
stressing the role of uncertainty. The reason is that after recognising the role 
of uncertainty, the dichotomy between consequentialist and deontological 
ethics can be seen in a different perspective.
When consequences and procedures are considered to be of an entirely 
different nature (the latter are actions and the former outcomes caused by 
actions), we tend to see both approaches (viz., consequentialist and deonto-
logical ethics) as irreducibly different. But when we realise that, for ethical 
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purposes, it is uncertainty that separates consequences and procedures (and 
not the fact that they have an entirely different nature), then the gap does not 
seem so strong. In fact, although uncertainty is a property of consequences, 
it is also a matter of degree: there is a continuum of possibilities between a 
certain consequence that is thus necessarily entailed in the procedure, and 
a completely uncertain consequence (so uncertain that only the procedure 
should be taken into account, since we have no idea of what will happen 
after such procedure). There is a degree of uncertainty associated with conse-
quences – although “risk” may be a better expression than “degree of uncer-
tainty”, given the usage of these words in the economic literature following 
Frank Knight,22 and also John Maynard Keynes.23
But conversely, where there is a degree of uncertainty, there is also a prob-
ability that given consequences might follow given procedures. In this sense, 
the gap between consequences and procedures, which is so crucial for the 
separation between deontological and consequencialist approaches, becomes 
less significant as the probability that given consequences and procedures are 
connected is increasingly higher.
So procedures and consequences are not irremediably separated, for 
uncertainty, the real ‘guillotine’ that divides the two, is not a fixed predicate, 
but a variable property. This implies that although consequences are not 
necessarily linked to procedures, there is always a relation between both, 
albeit a probabilistic relation. So if there is always (at least) a probabilistic 
link between procedures and consequences, then procedures can hardly be 
judged as entirely independent of consequences (unless uncertainty is infi-
nitely high). And once uncertainty is recognised to be a variable – in the sense 
of being a matter of degree – we must consider cases where we have low 
uncertainty, in which consequences cannot be said to be totally irrelevant.
The point of the modified version of the example presented above 
is not merely to show that if we lived in a world where procedures are 
necessarily linked to consequences, the gap between procedures and con-
sequences would not exist. The point of this extreme case, where uncer-
tainty is inexistent, is to show how uncertainty can play a role in many 
arguments that are made in favour of deontological approaches, and 
against the relevance of consequences. The fact that one may not find this 
modified version of the example as supportive of Kant’s position as the 
original version means that much of its persuasiveness springs from 
the uncertainty of (unforeseen) consequences.
22 kNiGht, Frank H. – Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston, Mass.: Hart, Schaffner & Marx; 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.
23 keyNes, John Maynard – The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Vol. viii: Treatise 
on Probability (1921). London: Royal Economic Society, 1973; id. – The General Theory of Employ-
ment, Interest and Money. London: MacMillan, 1936.
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Thus, it is possible to reconcile deontological perspectives and consequen-
tialist approaches, and to include both in economic analysis, as Sen suggests. 
The relative value of procedures (comparatively to our valuation of conse-
quences) would be higher under a higher level of uncertainty, and the relative 
value of consequences (comparatively to our valuation of procedures) would 
be higher under a lower level of uncertainty. Of course, the nature of the 
consequences or of the procedure would also be important: one would be less 
willing to take the risk of causing a consequence as serious as the death of a 
person, than to take the risk of causing a less serious consequence. Hence, 
one may reasonably be inclined to avoid a procedure that would lead to a very 
grave consequence even if the probability of its occurrence were small. But 
the degree of uncertainty would be a key element when deciding whether to 
follow a deontological law, or to take consequences into account.
Deontological approaches are appropriate in a set of particular cases, 
namely those where there is an extremely high level of uncertainty, whilst 
consequentialist evaluation is more appropriate whenever there is a low level 
of uncertainty regarding outcomes. But perspectives where only procedures 
matter, or where only consequences matter, constitute particular cases only. 
In general, both procedures and consequences must be taken into account, 
with their relative valuation depending on the degree of uncertainty. This inte-
grated view of both approaches is in line with Sen’s conception of freedom 
where the latter contains both an opportunity aspect and a process aspect.
The role of uncertainty and probabilities in ethical analysis, and 
the existence of uncertainty concerning whether a given law should be 
followed, has been carefully examined in Roman Catholic thought too, 
in the debates about laxism (according to which an action which goes 
against a prohibiting law can be performed even if there is only a slight 
probability that our opinion on it being the right action is correct), proba-
bilism (according to which an action which goes against a prohibiting 
law can be undertaken if there is a reasonably solid probability that the 
opinion which supports such action is correct, even when it is never-
theless more probable that the opinion favouring the prohibiting law is 
correct), probabiliorism (which implies that one can perform an action 
which goes against a prohibiting law only if the opinion supporting the 
rightness of such an action is more probable than the converse opinion, 
viz., than the opinion which defends that the prohibiting law should be 
followed), and tutiorism (which held that a less safe opinion, i.e., the 
opinion which recommends not following a prohibiting law, must be the 
most probable, to the extent of being almost certain, or in fact absolutely 
certain, before it could be performed).
There are some similarities between some arguments made within 
the discussions surrounding laxism, probabilism, probabiliorism and 
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tutiorism, and the argument presented above, viz., the argument that the 
lower the degree of uncertainty concerning whether an undesired conse-
quence will occur if we follow a given deontological law, the more should 
we be inclined to take into account the consequence and not the deonto-
logical law.
The discussions surrounding laxism, probabilism, probabiliorism and 
tutiorism were mainly concerned with the probability of our opinion 
(on a whether given law should be followed) being correct. In this paper I 
have been mainly concerned with the probability of a given consequence 
occurring after a given procedure, and the uncertainty of unforeseen 
consequences. I have been concerned with what we may term as onto-
logical uncertainty about outcomes, and not with what we may term as 
moral uncertainty regarding our opinion on ethical rules and laws. In any 
case, the discussion concerning probabilities and ontological uncertainty 
undertaken in the present article could be fruitfully enriched if combined 
with the implications of the moral uncertainty about our opinions on 
ethical rules and laws for ethical analysis, a topic which has been exten-
sively discussed in Roman Catholic thought.
Some further points must be addressed before continuing. A first point 
is that in a deontological perspective, rights are seen as ‘side constraints’ 
which simply cannot be violated. In this sense, there could be no trade-off 
between telling a lie or the death of a person, even if both are regarded as two 
immediate outcomes that are inseparable from the corresponding procedures. 
Under this light, a supporter of a deontological approach could argue that 
deontological analysis applied to the modified version of the example above 
simply implies that both actions (to tell a lie or to cause (by omission) the 
death of a person) are morally wrong, for both imply a morally wrong proce-
dure (for, remember, in the modified version of the example consequences are 
included in the procedure), and so both violate the “side-constraints”.
But if it were so, we would be in a peculiar situation where all possible 
options are morally wrong, and ethical theory would give us no guidance 
regarding which choice to make. This seems to imply that either there 
can be some trade-off between rights and consequences, or if rights are 
really ‘side-constraints’ only, then in this situation one would not have any 
morally valid choice.
Another important point is that when other people are involved in 
the final outcome (like in the original specification of the example), we 
have other people’s responsibilities at play too. Kant’s point is that, since 
each person is responsible for her or his actions only, then the chooser 
is responsible for telling the truth or not, and the murderer is the sole 
responsible for the death of the victim.
NuNo o. MartiNs364
364
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
65 • 2009
A useful distinction could be made in order to analyse this issue, namely 
the distinction between responsibility for outcomes, and responsibility for the 
choice.24 It can be argued that the person who sets us the whole dilemma, i.e., 
the murderer who asks us where the victim is, is the first responsible for any 
outcome that may occur, for according to our will, the whole situation should 
not even exist. But discounting this responsibility, and taking into account that 
we choose between two options which were initially limited by the murder 
who creates the whole situation, we will be responsible for the choice only, 
not for the final outcome. Although we decide the final outcome, the direct 
responsibility for any outcome belongs to the person who constrained our 
options to these two alternatives. Nevertheless, there remains a choice to be 
made, and the question of which choice is morally valid remains.
5. Procedures and Consequences in Political Philosophy
Many approaches to political philosophy are underpinned by a deonto-
logical conception. Robert Nozick’s “entitlement theory” 25, for example, is in 
line with the previously described Kantian non-consequentialist framework. 
According to Nozick’s libertarianism, rules that cover personal liberties, and 
rights of holding, using, exchanging and bequeathing legitimately owned 
property, are procedural rules which cannot be violated, regardless of the 
particular consequences that may arise due to their exercise. So in Nozick’s 
libertarianism, libertarian rights are constraints that must be taken into 
account in every procedure, regardless of the consequences they may lead to. 
In this approach, liberties should be as broad as possible, provided that the 
same level of liberty can be achieved by all. John Rawls’ liberty principle is 
often also seen as a procedural rule, since it demands that “each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a simi-
lar liberty for others” (albeit the overall Rawlsian framework diverges from 
Nozick’s perspective in many other respects, such as issues of redistribution).26
Under the light of the arguments made above, deontological perspec-
tives like Nozick’s will be very useful in cases where there is a high degree of 
uncertainty concerning outcomes. However, under a lower degree of uncer-
tainty, some consequential analysis can be fruitfully combined with these 
approaches.
In fact, Sen points out how many non-consequentialist approaches actu-
ally end up by allowing for some consequential evaluation. In Nozick’s liber-
tarianism, for example, Nozick allows for consequences to matter in cases 
24 Cf. seN, Amartya K. – Rationality and Freedom, cit.
25 Nozick, Robert – Anarchy, State, and Utopia, cit.
26 Cf. rawls, John – A Theory of Justice, cit.
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where the exercise of libertarian rights would lead to “catastrophic moral 
horrors”. Sen makes the same remarks to the public choice approach of James 
Buchanan,27 noting that “[...] Buchanan’s support of market systems is based 
on a reading of the consequences that the market system tends to produce, 
and consequences certainly do enter substantially in Buchanan’s evaluation 
of procedures [...]”.28
Furthermore, Sen’s comments on Buchanan’s support of the market system 
could also be made to authors like Friedrich Hayek29, and many other authors 
of the Austrian economic tradition. Sen notes how even Kant, “often taken 
to be the quintessentially anti-consequentialist deontologist”, also takes the 
consequences of actions into account, for “[t]he rules that he [Kant] cham-
pions as “categorical imperatives” may not have been championed on grounds 
of consequences, but then Kant also proceeds to show how wonderful the 
consequences of such rules can actually tend to be”.30
Sen argues that the dichotomy between consequentialist and deontological 
approaches has impoverished both moral philosophy and welfare economics, 
emphasising the importance of valuing both the consequences and the proce-
dure itself:
[…] both the welfarist instrumental approach (including, inter alia, the traditional utili-
tarian approach) and the deontological approach are inadequate in important ways. 
Furthermore, their respective inadequacies are related to a common ground shared by 
the two, despite sharp differences in other respects. The particular common ground is 
the denial that realization and failure of rights should enter into the evaluation of states 
of affairs themselves and could be used for consequential analysis of actions. Nozick’s 
view that “rights do not determine a social ordering” is shared fully by welfarists in 
general and utilitarians in particular. Their ways part there, however, with the welfarist 
instrumentalist viewing rights in terms of their consequences for right-independent goals 
and the constraint-based deontologist reflecting rights without consequential justifica-
tion as constraints on actions. State-evaluation independent of rights leaves a gap that 
cannot be adequately closed by either of these approaches.31
Elsewhere, Sen has also pointed out how consequential analysis may 
be useful even in the analysis of rights and procedures:
Broadly consequential evaluation allows the relevant consequences to include not 
only such things as happiness or the fulfilment of desire on which utilitarians tend 
to concentrate, but also whether certain actions have been performed or certain 
rights have been violated. [...] Since consequentialist thinking has been very closely 
27 buchaNaN, James M. – “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets”. In: The Journal of 
Political Economy. 62 (1954), pp. 114-123.
28 seN, Amartya K. – Rationality and Freedom, cit.
29 hayek, Friedrich A. von – The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1960. A. Sen discusses Hayek’s thought in Rationality and Freedom, cit., pp. 507-508.
30 seN, Amartya K. – Rationality and Freedom, cit., p. 639.
31 seN, Amartya K. – “Rights and Agency”. In: Philosophy and Public Affairs. 11 (1982), pp. 5-6.
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linked with utilitarianism and related approaches, there is a long tradition of taking 
a very narrow view of what can count as consequences (roughly in line with what 
utilitarians wish to focus on.32
Sen’s proposes thus an integrated approach, one which takes into account 
not only “rightness of procedures” and the widest level of freedoms and 
liberties, but also consequences. As Sen argues, “[...] it is possible to take 
from utilitarianism its interest in consequences, and drop the assumption that 
only utility consequences ultimately matter”.33 In fact, Sen often criticised the 
subjective mental metric used in utilitarian ethics,34 but not its emphasis on 
consequences. For example, one could take into account the consequences of 
“procedural rights”, while also using these “procedural rights” as a basis for 
ethical judgement. This perspective would involve some synthesis between 
libertarian and utilitarian approaches.
Effectively, it is consequentialism, and not the notion of utility and its 
underlying subjective mental metric, the most consensual feature of utili-
tarianism even amongst utilitarians. For even early utilitarians like Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill had different views on the nature of utility, or 
the exact type of subjective well-being (or pleasure) implied in utilitarianism 
– with Bentham emphasising an homogeneous notion of subjective well-being 
(or pleasure), and Mill insisting on the qualitative differences between differ-
ent types of subjective well-being (or pleasure). However, both authors agreed 
that moral value depends on the consequences of an action.
Sen suggests the space of capabilities one has reason to value, instead of 
utilities, as the appropriate space for the ethical evaluation of consequences.35 
Capabilities are potential functionings, and functionings are what a person is 
or does. Sen’s notion of functioning as what a person is or does is rooted in 
an Aristotelian conception of human functioning. Capabilities constitute the 
“opportunity aspect” of freedom which, for Sen, must be combined with the 
“process aspect” of freedom in an integrated perspective.
According to Sen, the subjective mental metric of utilitarianism would 
lead us to consider a given person a with a high level of income, wealth, 
health, education, goods, and capabilities in general, to be in a situation of 
deprivation if this person a were unhappy (with a low utility level) despite the 
potential functionings available to her or him. Conversely, a person b with an 
extremely low level of income, wealth, health, education, goods, and capabili-
32 seN, Amartya K. – Rationality and Freedom, cit., p. 559.
33 Ibidem, p. 633.
34 Cf. seN, Amartya K. – Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985. For yet another see also Nozick, Robert – “The experience machine”. In: Glover, 
Jonathan (ed.) – Utilitarianism and Its Critics. New York; London: Macmillan Pub. Co.; Collier 
Macmillan Publishers, 1990.
35 seN, Amartya K. – Commodities and Capabilities, cit.
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ties in general would be considered to be in a higher level of well-being than 
person a, if person b were happier (with a higher utility level) despite her or 
his situation of capability deprivation.
Sen notes also how the psychological preferences of people in a situation 
of capability deprivation often become adapted to such a situation, resulting 
in a higher level of subjective utility or happiness, thus explaining for example 
the high level of subjective well-being of person b despite her or his situation 
of capability deprivation. But Sen argues that to consider the person b to be in 
a higher level of well-being than person a (with the corollary that any redistri-
bution of capabilities should favour person a, who already has a higher level 
of capabilities than b) contradicts our ethical intuition. The ethical space for 
assessing well-being, Sen concludes, should not be a subjective mental space, 
but an objective space.
However, Sen also argues that spaces such as Rawlsian primary goods 
(or, for that effect, Ronald Dworkin’s resources, or other spaces like incomes or 
wealth) are inappropriate too, because even though these are objective entities 
(and not psychologically subjective spaces), they do not take into account the 
differences between human beings. Different people will need different levels 
of Rawlsian primary goods (for example, a person with a physical disability 
may need more goods than a person without any disability). Utilitarianism 
takes into account differences between people, but according to a subjective 
mental metric. Sen’s notion of functioning attempts to take into account the 
differences between human beings but in a more objective way. Furthermore, 
Sen argues that human advantage should be measured in terms of potential 
well-being, and not the space of actual well-being. Hence, the use that the 
author makes of the notion of capabilities, which are potential functionings. 
It is in the space of human capabilities that consequences – the opportunity 
aspect of freedom – should be assessed.
To incorporate procedures and consequences in an integrated approach 
clearly requires some sort of comparison between the two. Sen refers to such 
a comparison as a valuational exercise, where the trade-offs between proce-
dures and consequences are taken into consideration. This involves a quite 
different perspective on procedures than the one taken by approaches where 
libertarian rights are nothing more than ‘side-constraints’. In fact, it becomes 
meaningless to talk about valuation if libertarian rights are seen as ‘side- 
constraints’, since in such a case the “’rightness’ of procedures” is not compa-
rable to anything else. Indeed, for Sen
[...] libertarianism does not attempt to incorporate the relevance of processes in the 
valuational exercise. [...] process requirements are treated, in effect, as “admission 
rules” of acceptable systems, and it is in this form that they get priority, without being 
included in some general valuational exercise.36
36 seN, Amartya K. – Rationality and Freedom, cit., p. 628.
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After all, both utilitarianism and libertarianism tend to ignore the role of 
processes in a valuational exercise: the former due to the sole focus on utility 
consequences, and the latter by not even engaging on a valuational exercise at 
all. In Sen’s view, his own integrated approach is also shared by Rawls in his 
“difference principle”:
In John Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness,” the unconditional priority of rights 
reflected in the first principle is taken to be of the “independent” type, but his treat-
ment of liberties as being among the “primary goods,” reflected in the second prin-
ciple, is clearly of the “integrated” type.37
Furthermore, Sen explains that even the Rawlsian “liberty principle”, 
often taken to reflect a consequence-independent view, can also be seen as 
involving some sort of consequentialism. Referring to Rawls’ liberty principle, 
that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others”, Sen argues that “[w]henever any 
requirement of liberty is presented in a form that makes one person’s liber-
ties conditional on similar liberties for all, an analysis of the consequences 
of liberties is inescapably involved”, and also that “[d]espite the apparently 
“independent” form of Rawls’s principles of liberty, there is quite a bit of “inte-
gration” implicit in the formulations and reformulations chosen by Rawls.” 38
6. Intentions, Behaviour and Morality
Sen has also acknowledged the role of intentions when judging the moral 
value of actions. He argues against the claim that all actions must necessarily 
be “valued-loaded”, explaining how an action might have been triggered by 
mere curiosity, without any moral reasoning behind.39 His argument that an 
action undertaken due to curiosity (and not because of any ethical motiva-
tion) is “value-free”, seems to imply that the morality of an action depends on 
the intention of the agent, a view that is present in the work of Kant as well.
Now, intentions are important for an ethical perspective of economics 
for another reason. The study of microeconomic behaviour requires the 
analysis of underlying motivations, including intentions, beliefs and ethi-
cal values. In neoclassical economics, motivation is described in terms of 
the agent’s optimisation of a utility function, which represents the agent’s 
self-interest. Sen has called for a broader conception of the human agent 
than the one that pervades neoclassical economic analysis, and suggests 
a conception of the human agent which takes into consideration not only 
37 Ibidem, p. 636.
38 Idem, p. 638.
39 seN, Amartya K. – “Descriptions As Choice”. In: Oxford Economic Papers. 32 (1980), 
pp. 353-369.
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self-interest, but also moral sentiments and moral imperatives. Indeed, he 
argues that the account of rational behaviour that underpins neoclassical 
economics
has denied room for some important motivations and certain reasons for choice, 
including some concerns that Adam Smith had seen as parts of standard “moral 
sentiments” and Immanuel Kant had included among the demands of rationality in 
social living (in the form of “categorical imperatives”).40
But the question arises as to whether Sen’s acceptance that human 
agents can act according to Smithian moral sentiments, and Aristotelian 
dispositions, notions which are akin to the ‘virtue ethics’ tradition, creates 
or not (from an ethical point of view) an inconsistency with Sen’s accept-
ance that Kantian “moral imperatives” can be an important motivation for 
human agents. Where does the morality of the action spring from in the 
end: from Aristotelian ethical dispositions, Smithian moral sentiments, or 
the Kantian categorical imperative? This is an ethical question regarding 
the morality of human actions.41
As we know, Kant makes a distinction between “autonomy” and “heter-
onomy” of the will. When an action is caused by reason, through con-
scious reflection, it follows from the “autonomy” of the will. But when 
the action is triggered by feelings or impulses other than reason, then we 
have the “heteronomy” of will at play. Kant argues that an action contains 
morality only if it was caused by conscious reflection (by the “autonomy” 
of the will), and is grounded on the categorical imperative. According to 
Kant, the very same action does not contain moral value if the cause for 
it was any other than conscious reflection (for example, if it was caused 
by motivations related to the “heteronomy” of will, such as feelings or 
impulses other than reason).
Authors like Adam Smith or even Aristotle, on the other hand, do not 
deny the morality of actions caused by sentiments. In Aristotelian ethics, 
which is one of the foundations of Sen’s analysis,42 moral virtue is obtained 
through the habit of moderating human dispositions, where the latter are 
generated by impulses or feelings. Effectively, one of the main differences 
40 seN, Amartya K. – Rationality and Freedom, cit., p. 28.
41 A. Sen’s acceptance that human agents may follow Kant’s categorical imperative can be 
also seen as a descriptive claim about what human agents actually do, and not a prescriptive 
claim about what human agents should do. His reference to Kantian moral imperatives can 
indeed be seen as being concerned with an ontological explanation of human motivation. The 
question, therefore, would be whether a conception where human motivation can be caused by 
Aristotelian dispositions, Smithian moral sentiments, and Kantian moral imperatives, provides 
or not a consistent ontological explanation for human behaviour. In what follows, I shall first 
address the ethical question and then the ontologycal one.
42 Cf. seN, Amartya K. – Development As Freedom, cit., p. 289.
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between the Aristotelian view and the Platonic view of human behavior 
is that, contrarily to Plato, Aristotle held that virtue consists in the 
practical habit of moderating affections, rather than in moderate and 
right affections themselves.43 But for Aristotle, unlike Kant, an action 
caused by impulses and emotions can be morally valid, should the latter 
be adequately moderated.
Kant seemingly makes one exception, which is actually only an appar-
ent exception. He never argues that actions caused by the sentiment of 
“respect” are not moral. But he also argues that the sentiment of respect is 
firstly generated by reason, and thus by the “autonomy” of the will, not by 
the “heteronomy” of the will. Hence, even here moral value is considered 
to exist in the “autonomy” of the will only.
This means that an action caused by the sentiment or feeling of sym-
pathy can never be morally valid in Kant’s perspective, but the very same 
action can contain morality if it was deliberated through moral reasoning 
via the categorical imperative. Kant’s perspective could seem to be incon-
sistent with authors like Aristotle and Adam Smith,44 for whom an action 
does not have less moral value when it is caused by sympathy. The feeling 
of sympathy constitutes the foundation for Adam Smith’s theory of moral 
sentiments, and its moral value is not denied in Aristotelian ethics either.
But must there be such a rigid separation between Kantian moral 
imperatives on the one hand, and Smithian moral sentiments or Aristote-
lian dispositions on the other hand, as it is often argued? Kant’s perspective 
seems very restrictive because of the way in which the Kantian criterion 
is applied. Kant applies the criterion of universability to the domain of 
maxims of the will. That is, the maxims of the will that are morally valid 
are those that can become a universal law. However, the moral procedure 
of selecting which maxims of the will are valid is being interpreted here as 
if our reason (which enables the autonomy of the will) were independent 
of any emotional content. It is a rational procedure where impulses, emo-
tions and feelings (i.e., “heteronomy” of the will) are completely absent.
43 For further discussion, see sMith, Adam (1723-1790) – The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
pp. 315-321.
44 These are arguably the most influential authors in Sen’s writings. Cf. walsh, Vivian – 
“Smith After Sen”. In: Review of Political Economy. 12 (2000), pp. 5-25; id. – “Sen After Putnam”. 
In: Review of Political Economy. 15 (2003), pp. 315-394; PutNaM, Hilary – The Colapse of the Fact/
Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002; MartiNs, 
Nuno O. – “Ethics, Ontology and Capabilities”. In: Review of Political Economy. 19 (2007), 
pp. 37-53. See also seN, Amartya K. – Development As Freedom, cit.; id. – “Sen After Putnam”. 
In: Review of Political Economy. 17 (2005), pp. 107-113.
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But must it be so? Contemporary research in the cognitive sciences,45 
as well as in the philosophy of mind,46 suggests that rationality is always 
supported by dispositions, emotions, feelings and sentiments, and thus the 
Kantian division between “autonomy” of the will and “heteronomy” of the 
will may not be as strong as it is often suggested. Damásio argues namely 
that rationality cannot be seen as completely separated from emotions, 
since our decisions are always biased depending on the emotional charge 
associated with each option available to us.47 He also notes that the exis-
tence of an emotional bias helps us in the computation of various possible 
options by emphasizing some options above others, and increasing the 
speed of decision-making. The result is an improvement of the efficiency 
of our decision making process. In fact, without such an emotional bias 
our working memory could not process all the available options, and thus 
a rational procedure devoid of any emotional content is not even possible. 
Thus, our mental representations and our emotions (and sentiments) are 
strongly interconnected, and causally interact in both directions.
So even if we want to define morality as a property of rational inten-
tions only, the fact that the latter depend on emotions, sentiments and 
dispositions in general will lead us to attach moral value to the latter as 
well, in line with Aristotle and Adam Smith. In the same way we saw 
above that consequences are already, to a certain extent, entailed in (or 
in a probabilistic relation with) procedures, so are dispositions, emotions 
and sentiments already implied in the rational scrutiny of the maxims of 
the will.
Kant starts from the premise that only the will can contain morality 
(only the will can be said to be “good”), and it is this premise that justi-
fies the application of the categorical imperative to the maxims of the 
will only. But one need not constrain “will” to a rational will devoid of any 
sentiment or emotion, thus constraining the application of the categorical 
imperative to the domain of the maxims of a narrowly defined rational 
will.
Of course, the point made above does not imply that we must reject 
the Kantian moral system, but only the requirement that sentiments play 
no role in our reasoned scrutiny concerning whether “maxims of the will” 
are in accordance with the categorical imperative. The point made above 
simply means that reasoned scrutiny must be defined in a more inclu-
sive way, so that the Kantian procedure of scrutinising the maxims of the 
45 Cf. daMásio, António R. – Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New 
York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1994; ledoux, Joseph E. – The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious 
Underpinnings of Emotional Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996.
46 Cf. searle, John R. – The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin, 1995.
47 Cf. daMásio, António R. – Descartes’ Error, cit.
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will can be applied in a broader perspective, taking into account that the 
process of reasoned scrutiny of our maxims of the will depends on emo-
tions, feelings and sentiments.
In fact, one could go further, and apply the Kantian criterion of 
universability to the domain of sentiments, as opposed to rational motives 
only, in order to check which “sentiments” are always in accordance with 
the moral law. Therefore, one could not only apply the Kantian criterion in 
a broader perspective (taking into account the role emotions and feelings 
play in reasoned scrutiny), but also to a broader domain (scrutinising not 
only the maxims of the will, but also emotions, feelings and sentiments).
This approach would share some similarities with the ‘virtue ethics’ 
approach, in which any criterion of morality (if there is one) is to be 
applied to the character and dispositions of the individual. Instead of 
checking whether the maxim of the will underlying a given action is in 
accordance with the categorical imperative one could, for example, verify 
whether the sentiment of ‘sympathy’ could satisfy the Kantian criterion, 
of being desirable or logically consistent as a universal sentiment. Such 
a procedure would allow respecting both the requirement that action is 
motivated by moral sentiments, and that such moral sentiments were 
consciously reflected upon through reasoned scrutiny.
If one would find this direct adaptation of Kantian moral theory (of 
applying the universability criterion directly to the domain of sentiments) 
inconsistent with the Kantian distinction between “autonomy” and “heter-
onomy” of the will, one could apply it indirectly to sentiments, for example 
by checking whether all maxims coherent with the sentiment of sympa-
thy satisfy the categorical imperative. In this latter case, the categorical 
imperative is still applied to maxims, and only the latter are compared to 
sentiments. That is, one would check whether the maxims that sentiments 
generate are compatible with the categorical imperative, but sentiments 
would not be directly scrutinised through the categorical imperative as such.
So the extent to which an Aristotelian or Smithian perspective is incom-
patible with Kantian ethics may still be a matter open to debate, and Sen’s 
reference to all these three authors (viz., Aristotle, Smith and Kant) as 
major inspirations to his work may not be as inconsistent as it could look 
prima facie. The usual interpretation of the Kantian distinction between 
“autonomy” and “heteronomy” of the will is grounded on a too narrow 
definition of human reason, where the latter is seen as totally independent 
from emotions, sentiments and dispositions. But there is no need to 
exclude Smithian moral sentiments and Aristotelian dispositions from a 
broader conception of human reasoning, in which rationality is supported 
by emotional and dispositional conditions, along the lines of recent devel-
opments in the cognitive sciences and also in the philosophy of mind.
Moral Foundations of Economic Analysis 373
373
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
65 • 2009 1-
Furthermore, the links between emotions and rationality point towards 
an integrated ontological conception of the human agent, where the latter 
comprises a structure of dispositions which support emotions and sen-
timents, which in turn support rational deliberation.48 From an onto- 
logical point of view, Sen’s integrated approach is also more consistent 
with recent neurobiological and psychological research than the neoclas-
sical conception.
In fact, neoclassical economics postulates that there is always a com-
plete ordering which describes the preferences of the human agent. Sen 
criticises this postulate, and argues that the human agent possesses com-
peting motivations – including Aristotelian dispositions, Smithian moral 
sentiments, and Kantian moral imperatives – which can lead to value con-
flicts, and to the existence of multiple (possibly incomplete) preference 
orderings.49 Contrarily to the neoclassical perspective, Sen’s perspective 
seems to be supported by the empirical evidence provided by neuroscience 
and psychology, which point towards a modular conception of the human 
brain, in which not all brain regions are activated when performing 
given actions, and in which the human agents comprises a structured set 
of dispositions which may lead the existence of conflicting motivations. 
So not only is Sen’s perspective morally consistent, as also ontologically 
grounded on a realistic conception of human nature.
7. Conclusion
The writings of Amartya Sen constitute an attempt to bring a broader 
philosophical dimension to economics. In so doing, Sen joins elements from 
consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethics, and also from 
authors often associated with ‘virtue ethics’, like Aristotle or Adam Smith. 
A crucial question raised by Sen’s project is whether these different elements 
can be brought together in a consistent way. It was argued that consequen-
tialism and deontological approaches are not irreducibly incoherent, and 
that the emphasis on human dispositions and sentiments, so characteristic of 
‘virtue ethics’, is not irreconcilable with Kantian moral imperatives.
In a situation where consequences are in some way already entailed in 
procedures (for example because there is a small degree of uncertainty, or 
maybe none), a given action is almost necessarily followed by correspond-
ing consequences. In such a situation, consequences would be to some extent 
entailed in the procedures which are connected to them. I tried to argue that 
the separation usually assumed between procedures and consequences may 
48 Cf. daMásio, António R. – op.cit.; ledoux, Joseph, E. – op.cit.
49 Cf. seN, Amartya K. – Choice, Welfare, and Measurement, cit.; id. – Rationality and Freedom, 
cit.
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be in fact quite weak, and thus even a deontological approach might have to 
incorporate consequences.
In fact, processes and consequences cannot be separated, for a process 
always leads to some consequence, and the latter is thus always caused by 
previous procedures. To define some consequences as ‘ethically correct’ 
induces a mapping of ‘ethically correct’ procedures: those that lead to 
such consequences. And since this mapping is bi-univocal, the converse 
also applies.
What distinguishes procedures and consequences nevertheless is 
their succession in time, and the uncertainty about future events. It is 
the degree of uncertainty that determines whether procedures or conse-
quences are more important for any ethical evaluation. The moral value of 
consequences has the more weight the more predictable they are, whereas 
in highly uncertain situations procedures will be more important for 
ethical analysis. In fact, under an extremely high level of uncertainty con-
sequences can hardly be anticipated, and thus we can only be sure of our 
own procedure. Even if one starts from a consequentialist perspective, 
the fact that uncertainty, processes and time are real and irreducible onto-
logical constituents of reality makes procedural rules important too.
Therefore, deontological approaches seem particularly useful to assess 
cases where there is a high degree of uncertainty concerning outcomes, 
whereas consequentialist evaluation seems the more appropriate the lower 
is the degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, approaches that are exclusively 
deontological, or exclusively consequentialist, are adequate for particular 
cases only. In general, both consequences and processes seem to be cru-
cial for ethical analysis, and for an integrated conception of freedom, as 
Sen so rightly suggests.
This point also has implications for the analysis of human behaviour. 
If we must take into account our beliefs about what consequences will 
occur when we act, then we must incorporate the degree of uncertainty 
in our moral judgment, giving more weight to the moral value of conse-
quences when these are more predictable, and more weight to our own 
procedure itself when consequences are highly uncertain. Kant focuses 
only on the immediate procedure, without explaining that the moral value 
of our (immediate) procedure is important because of the uncertainty of 
consequences.
The role of uncertainty in ethical and economic decision making has in 
fact been much discussed in the Cambridge economic tradition, to which 
Sen belongs,50 a tradition in which economics and philosophy are closely 
50 Cf. MartiNs, Nuno O. – “Sen’s Capability Approach and Post Keynesianism: Similarities, 
Distinctions and the Cambridge Tradition”. In: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. 31 (2009), 
pp. 691-707.
Moral Foundations of Economic Analysis 375
375
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
65 • 2009 1-
connected. Thus, uncertainty and probabilities concerning future events 
play a central role in the analysis of ethical decision making undertaken 
by the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore, while the role of uncertainty 
and probabilities in economic decision making has been much discussed 
by the Cambridge economist John Maynard Keynes.51 Indeed, there are 
close links between the approach suggested here and the work of Moore 
and Keynes.
Moreover, the analysis of economic behaviour could benefit from the 
consideration of different ethical motivations, as discussed by authors like 
Aristotle, Adam Smith or Immanuel Kant. It was argued that the Kantian per-
spective may not be completely incongruent with the Aristotelian or Smithian 
perspective, for recent developments in the cognitive sciences, the philosophy 
of mind, and in the study of rationality, suggest that (Kantian) moral impera-
tives can hardly be derived without taking into account sentiments or disposi-
tions, like Smithian moral sentiments or Aristotelian dispositions.
In the same way that consequences and procedures may not be totally 
separable as they often are taken to be in ethical analysis, so are moral imper-
atives, moral sentiments and human dispositions more interrelated than it 
is usually assumed. If the arguments presented are correct, Amartya Sen’s 
attempt to bring different elements from various ethical theories to economic 
analysis has the potential of providing a consistent alternative to the utilitarian 
philosophy that underpins neoclassical economics.
51 For a discussion, cf. lawsoN, Tony – “Uncertainty and Economic Analysis”. In: Economic 
Journal. 95 (1985), pp. 909-927; ruNde, J. – “Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Argu-
ments”. In: Economics and Philosophy. 6 (1990), pp. 275-292; NuNes, M. J. – O Pensamento de 
Keynes. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 1998.

